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W
e live in a time of rapid technological change, in which the arrival
of new ways of conducting business has become a commonplace
occurrence. One segment of the economy where these changes are
having a particularly signiﬁcant effect is the payment system, the web of
banks and other institutions through which payments for goods and services are
cleared and settled. New mechanisms such as smart cards and internet-based
electronic money have captured the imagination of many payment system ob-
servers and participants. While earlier predictions of the death of paper money
have proven premature, the unprecedented pace of technological advance in
the last decade has given new hope to the prophets of the electronic age.
The Federal Reserve (the Fed) plays a prominent role in the payment
system, both as a provider of payment services and as a regulator. The public
interest in an economically efﬁcient payment system has been at the core of Fed
payment system policy since the Fed’s founding in 1914. With new electronic
payment mechanisms apparently within grasp, there has been renewed attention
to the role of the Fed in the innovative process. A committee headed by Federal
Reserve Board Vice Chair Alice Rivlin recently completed a study of the Fed’s
role in the payment system, which gave special attention to how active a role
the Fed should play in guiding payment system innovation.1
Within the Federal Reserve System, electronic check presentment (ECP)
is seen as a potentially promising step in the evolution toward electronic pay-
ments. With ECP, consumers and businesses continue to make payments with
paper checks, but banks and clearinghouses that clear and settle payments use
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electronic information “captured” from the checks shortly after they are ﬁrst
deposited in the banking system. (See Appendix.) While some ECP services
are now available, many important aspects of full-scale implementation are still
under discussion. The Fed’s role in developing and promoting ECP is clearly
aimed at the public interest objective of enhancing payment system efﬁciency.
In what follows, we ask whether the Fed can be a payment system innovator
while remaining loyal to its fundamental public interest objective. In particu-
lar, how can we ensure that the Fed’s payment system leadership contributes
to economic efﬁciency?
Our approach to this policy question is founded on the notion that the pay-
ment system is a communications industry. Such industries involve substantial
common costs—costs that cannot be uniquely attributed to any one user. This
cost characteristic has important implications for industry behavior. The critical
issue in such industries is how common costs are allocated across users.
Markets for communication services (including payment services) tend to
be heavily regulated and, in some instances, served by government-owned en-
terprises, such as the U.S. Postal Service. Concerns about “universal access”
often motivate government intervention. Here, universal access is usually in-
terpreted as a concern about the cost of services to a particular class of users:
residential phone customers, rural postal patrons, or small and remote depos-
itory institutions. Access has been provided through price regulation, as in
telecommunications, and by direct government provision, as in the U.S. Postal
Service.
We show that government involvement in other communications industries
offers lessons for the role of the Federal Reserve in the payment system. In
both the telecommunications and postal services industries, legal barriers to
competition historically have helped sustain the provision of universal access.
Barriers to competition allow the shifting of common costs to be pushed to the
point where some users are subsidized, in a sense that we will make precise
later. Such subsidization is inconsistent with economic efﬁciency, and would
be impossible without barriers to competition. We point out that the Federal
Reserve Banks still beneﬁt from some barriers to competition—privileged treat-
ment under current check presentment regulations—that would allow them to
subsidize should they choose to do so. Federal Reserve policy explicitly seeks
to prevent subsidization, and there is no direct evidence that the Fed currently
subsidizes any segment of the check collection market. At the same time, how-
ever, it is clear that available analytical methods for determining the absence
of subsidies are imperfect.
Barriers to competition impede technological progress by distorting adop-
tion choices. The contrasting experiences of the telecommunications and postal
services industries illustrate this fundamental conﬂict. In telecommunications,
the removal of barriers and a retreat from access have been accompanied by
rapid technological innovation. The U.S. Postal Service has retained barriers to      
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competition and in the view of some observers has been relatively slow to adopt
innovations. Barriers provide the opportunity for cross-subsidies that distort the
innovative process. Against this background, we argue that the Fed should act
to preclude subsidization by removing remaining barriers to competition. As
we emphasize, however, this step may require some retreat from the goal of
providing universal access.
1. THE PAYMENT SYSTEM AS A
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
In the U.S. economy, roughly 220 million market transactions are made with-
out cash daily, with a total dollar value of $1.6 trillion.2 These transactions all
involve credit. The seller receives a ﬁnancial instrument representing a claim
on either the buyer or a third party. For example, a check is the liability of
the check writer and his or her bank. A credit card sale results in a claim—a
“sales slip”—that entitles the merchant to good funds. Similarly, a debit card
transaction gives the merchant a claim to good funds.
The clearing and settling of credit instruments used as means of payment in-
trinsically requires communication. A vast web of bookkeeping systems records
the assets and liabilities of various economic entities—bank accounts, loan
balances, investment funds, and the like. Noncash payment instruments are
fundamentally bookkeeping instructions to debit an account of the buyer and
credit an account of the seller. Those instructions must be communicated to the
relevant bookkeeping systems in order to carry out the necessary accounting
entries.
The payment system bundles together communication and ﬁnancial ser-
vices. Arrangements governing the use of payment instruments specify the
allocation of risks associated with payment failures. For example, the merchant
accepting a check bears the risk that the check writer may fail to cover it, but
the merchant does not bear the risk of a fraudulent credit card purchase. While
these risk-sharing arrangements are an important feature of the evolution of
the payment system, they do not make the fundamental function of payment
arrangements inherently different from other communication services.
Every new development in communication technology brings with it a
new possibility for sending payment instructions. Improvements in freight
transportation increase the speed and reliability with which checks can be
delivered to a buyer’s bank. Improvements in computer and telecommuni-
cations technologies facilitate the sending of payment instructions in elec-
tronic form directly to and from banks. Optimism about the transition to
electronic payment instruments is based on the assessment that the technologies
2 Bank for International Settlements (1996).        
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underlying electronic communications systems are improving rapidly, while
physical transportation technologies are improving only slowly at the present
time.3
2. SOME NOTEWORTHY CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
Economists have long noted that communications industries share certain dis-
tinct characteristics that have, in turn, heavily inﬂuenced industry behavior. The
most salient of these is the prevalence of common costs. The allocation of these
costs among diverse users is fundamental to the operation of communications
industries. Governments tend to intervene in such industries to allocate these
common costs in such a way as to promote access.
In what follows we employ a few technical terms that are necessary for
a clear understanding of the economics of communications industries. While
these terms are deﬁned as they are introduced, they also appear in a glossary
at the end of the article.
Common Costs
Every communication beneﬁts two parties, the sender and the receiver. How
should the costs of a message (a phone call, a letter, an e-mail) be divided
between the two beneﬁciaries? The answer is not entirely obvious. While
providers of communication services often collect fees from the sender, services
are provided jointly to both parties. The costs of providing these services cannot
be uniquely attributed to either of the beneﬁciaries. We call such costs common
costs. Common costs also extend beyond the level of the individual message.
A large part of the infrastructure costs of a communication system, such as
phone lines and information processing resources, are common to all users of
the system.
The signiﬁcance of common costs distinguishes communications from
many other industries. For most other goods and services, a large part of the
costs of an individual’s consumption can be uniquely attributed to that individ-
ual. The time that a dentist, a barber, or a mechanic spends serving a customer
is a cost of serving that customer exclusively. Costs that can be unambiguously
associated with the provision of goods or services to a particular individual are
attributable costs.
For some costs, specifying whether they are common or attributable is not
so simple. Costs that arise from a single message from a sender to a receiver
(a single phone call, for instance) are attributable to that pair of users but are
common between them. Similarly, the transportation costs of a single shipment
3 Federal Reserve System (1998).      
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of mail between two points are attributable to the group of people sending
or receiving letters on that shipment but are common among the members of
that group. In communications industries, there are very few costs that are
attributable to individual users, but there are many costs that are attributable to
speciﬁc groups of individuals. There are also substantial costs that are common
to entire communication systems.
Common costs are often ﬁxed costs; they do not vary with the amount of
goods or services produced. An industry that has large ﬁxed costs and relatively
small variable costs will exhibit economies of scale (declining average costs)
over some range of output levels. When there are costs that are common to
the production of multiple goods, then production is said to exhibit economies
of scope. Economies of scale and scope are important characteristics of many
communications markets because many costs are common among all users of
the network.
Another notable feature of communications markets is in the nature of
demand for such services. The economic value to an individual of having ac-
cess to a communication system depends on the individual’s own demands for
connection to others and on the extent of the network of individuals connected
by the system. A consumer will be willing to pay more for a communication
service that allows communication with a larger set of correspondents. This
relationship between an individual’s valuation of a communication service and
the extent of the network is referred to by economists as a network effect. Note,
however, that a network effect is a consequence of both the interdependence of
demand for communication and the existence of common costs. The idea that
an individual “belongs to a network” is only meaningful if there are common
costs associated with linking people together.
The presence of common costs and network effects makes it difﬁcult to
unambiguously specify the cost of serving a particular individual or group. On
the one hand, one can ask, “Given that services are already being provided
to others, what would it cost to extend service to this particular group?” The
answer to this question yields the incremental cost of serving a group of users.4
This deﬁnition excludes costs that are common to the delivery of service to
this group and to others. On the other hand, one might ask, “What would it
cost to provide services to this group if no one else were being served?” The
answer to this question yields the group’s stand-alone cost, which includes all
common costs. Clearly, when common costs are substantial, incremental cost
is much smaller than stand-alone cost.
4 It is important to distinguish between incremental and marginal costs. Marginal cost is the
added cost of the last unit of a good produced. Incremental cost is all of the additional costs that
arise from extending a particular set of services to a particular set of users. This may include costs
that are ﬁxed with regard to the quantity of services provided, such as the costs of connecting a
group of users to an existing network.       
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When there are no network effects, a group’s incremental cost is simply
the attributable cost of extending service to that group. When there are network
effects, the addition of the new group also has the effect of creating beneﬁts
for other users. These beneﬁts work to reduce the net cost of adding a new
group of users. Hence, we need a more general deﬁnition of incremental cost:
The incremental cost of extending service to a new group of users is
the cost of adding that group to the network, minus the beneﬁts for
others created by that group’s participation.
Some commentators have interpreted governmental concern for universal
access in communications industries as a necessary response to network effects.
Many believe reducing prices to some users may enhance efﬁciency by com-
pensating them for the network beneﬁts they bring to other participants. If the
total beneﬁts of an added participant, both to himself and to others, however,
are greater than the costs of adding that participant, then a privately operated
network will have an incentive to compensate the added participant. This would
be the case even in the absence of government intervention. Network effects
do not, by themselves, induce market failures.5
Allocating Common Costs
In pricing a communication service, a provider must decide who should bear the
common costs. There are many possibilities. One could recover all such costs
from one small group of buyers, or try to spread the burden evenly among all
buyers. We can evaluate alternative cost allocations according to two criteria.
First, are they consistent with efﬁcient use of the service? Second, could they
arise under competitive market conditions?
While there are many dimensions to the efﬁciency of a communication
services market, one essential consideration is that the allocation of costs must
provide customers with the right incentives to participate in the network. An
individual’s participation is economically efﬁcient if the resulting beneﬁts ex-
ceed the additional costs incurred. If the prospective customer is charged less
than incremental cost, his or her participation could be inefﬁcient, creating
beneﬁts smaller than the costs incurred. Hence, a minimal requirement for a
cost allocation to be consistent with efﬁcient use of the service is that no
individual or group of users should pay less than its incremental cost.
Like prices that are too low, prices that are too high can also interfere with
efﬁcient use of the service. In particular, suppose some prices were greater than
stand-alone cost. There might then be users willing to pay this cost, but not
willing to pay the higher cost imposed by the seller’s prices. Such users would
5 For alternative discussions of network effects as a source of market failure, see Economides
(1996) and Weinberg (1997).   
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be inefﬁciently excluded by prices that exceed stand-alone cost. Efﬁciency also
requires prices below stand-alone costs.
There is a natural tendency for market forces to produce prices that respect
the bounds of incremental and stand-alone costs. If there are no barriers to the
entry of new competitors, then the threat of such entry will serve to discipline
the pricing and cost allocation practices of incumbent suppliers. Suppose, for
example, that a group of customers is collectively paying more than its stand-
alone costs. This market segment would be particularly vulnerable to entry by
an alternative provider. The threat of such entry will limit the ability of the
incumbent to charge more than stand-alone cost.
The threat of competition, which prevents any individual or group from
bearing too large a share of common costs, also prevents anyone from bearing
too small a share. If a provider is to at least break even on the sale of services
and tries to charge some group less than their full incremental cost, then the
provider must recover from other users all of the common costs plus the deﬁcit
created by undercharging the favored group. Consequently, some set of buyers
must pay more than their stand-alone cost. With potential competition, how-
ever, this allocation of costs is not sustainable. Potential competition therefore
places both an upper and a lower bound on how much a customer or group of
customers can bear. The lower bound is the incremental cost of serving those
users, while the upper bound is stand-alone cost or the incremental cost of
adding those users to a competing network. Note that these bounds are the same
as those that guard against inefﬁcient use of a service. In short, competitive
pressures prevent inefﬁciency.
The evaluation of cost allocations on efﬁciency grounds is complicated by
the fact that incremental cost can be difﬁcult to measure. The categorization
of costs as attributable and common is not always straightforward. Even more
difﬁcult, however, is the identiﬁcation and measurement of the beneﬁts that
one individual’s or group’s participation brings to others. On the other hand, it
is relatively easy to determine whether there are signiﬁcant barriers to compe-
tition. If one can guard against such barriers, then market forces will tend to
produce cost allocations that respect the bounds of incremental and stand-alone
cost.
Government Intervention
In the United States and other countries, communications industries have typ-
ically been the object of substantial government intervention. Government
agencies or government-owned ﬁrms have typically provided postal services
and, in many countries, telecommunication services. In other cases, such as
telecommunications in the United States, provision of services by private en-
terprises has been subject to substantial price and product regulation.
The structural characteristics of communications industries drive govern-
ment intervention. There are, however, two distinct views about how these   
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characteristics motivate intervention. These industries are conducive to rela-
tively concentrated markets, which could give sellers the ability to exercise
monopoly (or near monopoly) power over prices. One common view is that
government intervention in communications industries is motivated by a de-
sire to limit anticompetitive behavior in markets that have natural monopoly
characteristics.
An alternative view states that government intervention is motivated by a
desire to place the cost allocation problem inherent in the pricing of communica-
tion services under political control. In communications industries, government
intervention has tended to tilt the allocation of common costs away from those
buyers with high attributable costs. This group of buyers often represents in-
dividuals in remote, rural locations. For instance, postal rates are independent
of the location to which mail is sent, although delivery costs are clearly higher
in rural areas. Also, when there are scale economies associated with service to
individual buyers, the per-unit attributable costs of serving large commercial
and industrial users will be less than those of serving small residential users.
When government intervenes to allocate service costs away from some
users and toward others, it might appear that the latter are subsidizing the
former. Intuitively, we might say that an individual buyer or a market segment
is subsidized if it is paying less than its share of production costs. As empha-
sized earlier, however, common costs make it difﬁcult to unambiguously deﬁne
the share of total costs borne by an individual or group. Subsidization is less
ambiguously deﬁned with reference to incremental costs. That is, an individual
or group is subsidized if it pays less than its incremental cost. If the provider
must cover all costs while subsidizing a set of buyers, payments received from
other buyers must be covering more than 100 percent of the common costs.
In this case (and only in this case) we say that some buyers cross-subsidize
others. As previously noted, competition or potential competition will limit a
seller’s ability to engage in pricing that results in such subsidies.
Government intervention that respects the bounds of incremental and stand-
alone costs can be consistent with the efﬁcient provision of services. The history
of public sector intervention in communications markets suggests that some-
times the beneﬁcial treatment of groups has gone further, resulting in prices
that are below incremental cost. First-class mail service to many hard-to-reach
endpoints, for instance, is widely believed to be subsidized. This sort of cross-
subsidization, however, is only possible if there are limits on competition. Prices
in a market segment in which the seller enjoys a legally protected monopoly
are not constrained to be below stand-alone cost. The seller might then be able
to raise enough revenues in the protected segment to cover any losses incurred
in selling to a subsidized segment.
When cost allocations are subject to political control, through either the
regulation of private providers or the public provision of services, allocation
choices are often justiﬁed in terms of access. Governments have tended to view       
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themselves as guarantors of widespread access to communication systems. This
interest in access has sometimes been motivated by the view that the universal-
ity of a communication network is an inherently worthy goal. In other instances,
the motivation arises from the concern for the consequences of market outcomes
for certain high-cost segments of users—rural postal customers, for example.
In either case, interest in access may result in cost allocations in which some
users subsidize others.
3. A LOOK AT OTHER COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
Communications industries, we have argued, are characterized by common
costs—costs that cannot be uniquely attributed to any particular user or set of
users. Government intervention in such industries is often aimed at altering the
allocation of common costs across users. In the name of universal access, such
intervention often reduces the portion of common costs borne by some users.
Legal barriers to competition aid in cost shifting, but distort the decisions of
potential competitors.
The twentieth-century experience of two prominent communications
industries—telecommunications and postal services—offers valuable insights.
In both there are signiﬁcant common costs and a tendency toward few com-
petitors. Both were subject to signiﬁcant government intervention that shifted
the incidence of common costs and raised barriers to competition, although
in recent decades these barriers have come under pressure. Public policy has
responded very differently in each industry with divergent results, particularly
with regard to technological innovation. The history of these two industries
offers revealing lessons for the Federal Reserve’s role as a payment system
innovator.
Telecommunications
For many decades, the telecommunications industry adhered to the model of
protected, regulated monopoly.6 The prevailing industry structure had its be-
ginnings in the 1920s, when AT&T was allowed to amass a virtual monopoly
in phone services and operate free from the threat of competition. In exchange,
AT&T made large sunk investments in infrastructure to extend the national
network and subjected itself to rate-of-return regulation that sought to keep
charges to any buyers from being “too high.” This deal was supported by
AT&T’s argument that telephone service was a natural monopoly and that it
(AT&T) could provide universal access at lower cost than could a fragmented
industry.
6 For further resources on the history of the U.S. telecommunications industry, see Brock
(1986) or Bornholz and Evans (1983).   
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For basic local telephone services, buyer-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs are signiﬁcant
and variable costs are low. Hence, attributable costs per call tend to fall with
the number of calls over a wide range. Large industrial and commercial users’
average attributable costs are likely to be lower than those for small business
and residential users. The public interest in widespread access has typically
promoted price structures that mute these cost differences by shifting common
costs away from small users and toward large business users. In addition, cost
allocations tended to favor local service at the expense of long distance.
Through a series of moves by market participants and regulators, the struc-
ture of the telecommunications industry has evolved from one of an integrated,
regulated monopolist to one of more open competition. The Consent Decree of
1982, which settled a Justice Department antitrust case against AT&T, brought
competition to long distance markets, while the regional Bell companies re-
tained monopoly positions in local telephony.
Regulated pricing of local service continued to attempt to shift common
costs away from high-cost residential and rural users in particular. Such an al-
location required higher recovery from large commercial users and contributed
to commercial customers’ interest in alternatives to the regional Bells’ local
service, particularly with the proliferation of fax and data services. The long-
standing status of local service providers as protected, regulated monopolies
was increasingly unsustainable in the changing technological environment. The
1996 Telecommunications Act opened all markets to competition, and explicitly
recognized that doing so would put pressure on the industry’s ability to provide
inexpensive access to such high-cost users as rural hospitals.
The dismantling of barriers to competition in telecommunications has been
accompanied by rapid adoption of new technologies. While the by-pass services
that hastened the arrival of competition were made possible by technological
progress, competition itself has accelerated technological change by encourag-
ing innovation. In the process, the telecommunications industry and its regula-
tors have retreated from the goal of providing access through subsidized cost
allocations.
Postal Services
The U.S. government has been involved in postal services since the founding
of the nation and has long made universal access the central goal of federal
postal policy. In the nineteenth century, the ﬂow of information arising from a
universally accessible and affordable postal service was seen as an important
factor in the growth of a nation. The U.S. Postal Service’s legal monopoly
status has been seen as essential to the goal of universal access. With its pro-
tected position, the Postal Service can deliver ﬁrst-class mail to all locations in
the United States at a single price. Without this protection, competitors would
“skim the cream” by taking low-cost local business, thereby raising the costs      
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of serving the remaining markets. This view suggests cross-subsidized pricing,
since prices that are free of subsidies would be immune to cream-skimming.
The Postal Service’s legal monopoly on ﬁrst-class mail appears to have
affected other markets in which the monopoly does not apply. In parcel post
and package delivery, for instance, private ﬁrms are allowed to compete di-
rectly with the U.S. Postal Service, although they are signiﬁcantly constrained
in their ability to do so.7 Critics have claimed that the Postal Service uses funds
earned in the protected ﬁrst-class market to offer new services priced below
incremental cost in the more competitive package delivery business. A private,
proﬁt-seeking provider might not have an incentive to engage in such pricing
of new products; unproﬁtable entry into a new market is not a compelling goal
by itself. As a public entity, however, the Postal Service’s motivations are less
well deﬁned. While a public entity is charged with serving the public interest
and may generally seek to do so, it is hard to prevent at least some decisions
from being motivated by other goals. Entry into a new market, for instance,
may enhance the overall size and inﬂuence of the organization.
Without the discipline of potential competition, the U.S. Postal Service’s
incentives to maintain and enhance the cost efﬁciency of its operations are
muted. Some observers have noted the difﬁculties the Postal Service has ex-
perienced in the automation of mail processing.8 At the same time, potential
competitors incentives to develop innovative products and processes may well
be blunted by the Postal Service’s ability to subsidize its prices in competitive
market segments.
In short, the postal services and telecommunications industries in the United
States have followed divergent paths. While the telecommunications industry
has placed increasing reliance on markets to provide pricing discipline and
incentives to innovate, the U.S. Postal Service has retained a protected monop-
oly structure that may distort competition and can stiﬂe technological progress.
And while in telecommunications the pace of technological innovation has been
quite brisk, with the U.S. Postal Service the pace has been relatively slow.
4. FEDERAL RESERVE CHECK CLEARING
Check collection and other payment services share many features with network
communications industries like telecommunications and postal services. From
the earliest years Reserve Banks have enjoyed legal privileges that have aided
the Fed’s entry into check collection and have made the shifting of common
costs in the pursuit of universal access at least possible. Some competitive
advantages remain today, most notably the “six-hour monopoly,” which we
7 Sidak and Spulber (1996) give a detailed account on the restrictions facing private carriers.
8 Sidak and Spulber (1996).      
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discuss below. These privileges make it theoretically possible for the Fed to
subsidize some check-clearing services, in the speciﬁc sense that term was
deﬁned above. If the Fed were engaged in subsidization, by our deﬁnition, the
Fed’s presence could detract from economic efﬁciency. Moreover, as demon-
strated by the contrasting cases of telecommunications and postal services, the
capacity to subsidize would not bode well for the Fed’s ability to innovate in
the public interest. The critical question regarding Fed participation in check
collection, then, is whether under barriers to competition some check collection
services are in fact subsidized. If so, then the Fed’s participation would not only
detract from economic efﬁciency but could also distort the innovative process.
The Six-Hour Monopoly
The Federal Reserve Banks enjoy certain legal privileges in the check collection
business. The most important is the Reserve Banks’ right to present checks to a
paying bank until 2:00 p.m. and receive payment the same day; private-sector
banks must present by 8:00 a.m. in order to insist on same-day funds. In prac-
tice, private-sector banks can and often do present after 8:00 a.m., but only after
negotiating a voluntary agreement with the paying bank, presumably offering
the paying bank compensation in the form of reciprocity or presentment fees.
The Reserve Banks need not obtain prior permission. Thus, the Reserve Banks
enjoy a six-hour monopoly on free par presentment for same-day funds. Other
advantages also exist but they appear to be of minor signiﬁcance.9
The six-hour monopoly originated shortly after the founding of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 authorized the Reserve
Banks to offer check collection services to their member banks. An amendment
enacted on June 21, 1917, extended this authorization to allow the Reserve
Banks to clear checks for all banks. The amendment also prohibited charging
presentment fees against Reserve Banks, but this provision only applied to
banks that voluntarily joined the Fed’s collection system.10 The prohibition
9 The Reserve Banks voluntarily refrain from presenting between noon and 2:00 p.m. in
most markets. The six-hour monopoly is not the only legal presentment privilege enjoyed by the
Reserve Banks. For example, private-sector banks do not have as much ﬂexibility as Reserve
Banks in choosing where to present checks to paying banks. In addition, the paying bank controls
the intraday timing of payment to a private-sector presenting bank, while the Reserve Banks have
the right to debit the paying bank’s account within a speciﬁed time period. Because the other
legal privileges appear to be of minor signiﬁcance relative to the six-hour presentment monopoly,
we will focus on the latter, although what we have to say will apply equally well to these other
privileges. See Board of Governors (1998) and General Accounting Ofﬁce (1989) for more details.
10 The amendment provided that any bank could make “reasonable charges, to be determined
by the Federal Reserve Board, but in no case to exceed 10 cents per $100,” but that “no such
charges shall be made against the Federal Reserve Banks.” An opinion of the U.S. Attorney
General established that this latter provision applied only to banks that voluntarily joined the
Fed’s clearing system. Note that a state-chartered bank did not have to become a member of the
Federal Reserve System in order to participate in the Fed’s check collection plan.      
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codiﬁed and expanded a stipulation the Federal Reserve Board had imposed
earlier by regulatory ﬁat on member banks.11 Banks retained the right to charge
presentment fees to any other banks presenting by mail, however. Only the Re-
serve Banks could mail checks to participating banks and demand immediate
par settlement.
The Fed’s par presentment privilege was by all accounts essential in the
subsequent growth of the Reserve Bank check collection system. The ability to
present at par to member banks gave the Reserve Banks a cost advantage over
competitors. This advantage gave nonmember banks an incentive to join the
Fed’s collection system to obtain access to low-cost presentment at member
banks. The Reserve Banks required that banks joining the system also agree to
accept presentment at par. The upshot was that the more banks that joined the
Fed collection system, the greater the value of joining.12
From its founding in 1913, the Federal Reserve was eager to increase par-
ticipation in the Reserve Banks’ check collection system. For members of the
Federal Reserve System, access to the system was a beneﬁt that offset, in part,
the cost of stricter Fed reserve requirements, while nonmembers gained the
ability to present to participating banks at par. Despite these beneﬁts, the Fed
never completely monopolized interbank check collection. For some nonmem-
ber banks the income from presentment fees was apparently worth more than
the net value of lower-cost clearing services available from the Reserve Banks,
so these “nonpar banks” continued to charge presentment fees, a practice that
persisted for decades.13
The Monetary Control Act (MCA) of 1980 dramatically changed the na-
ture of the Fed’s check collection service. The MCA required Reserve Banks
to charge fees for their payment services which must, over the long run, cover
the direct and indirect costs of providing the services, including imputed costs
11 The ﬁrst Reserve Bank check-clearing arrangement, the so-called “voluntary plan” adopted
in 1915, required that member banks joining the plan accept checks at par from the Reserve
Banks. The “compulsory plan” adopted in May 1916 also included the same requirement but
had the Reserve Banks covering the expense of shipping notes or lawful money from the bank
to the Reserve Bank in payment. Such expenses were obviously not the only paying bank costs
attributable to check collection. Note that because nonmembers had to agree voluntarily to join
the Fed clearing plan, the amendment gave the Reserve Banks no real advantage over private
banks, since both needed to offer inducements to obtain par presentment rights. The amendment’s
effect was to codify the Reserve Bank’s right to present to member banks at par, by mail, without
prior permission. For discussions of the Fed’s entry into check clearing see the classic account
of Warren Spahr (1926), or more recently, Ed Stevens (1996, 1998) and Alton Gilbert (1998).
12 Note that the effect of the size of the Fed check collection system on the value of joining
did not necessarily reﬂect a network effect. Federal Reserve policy deliberately tied the service of
collecting a bank’s outgoing checks to that bank’s willingness to pay par on its incoming checks.
There was no technological link between the number of banks sending checks to the Fed and the
number of banks to which the Fed could send checks.
13 See Jessup (1967) and Stevens (1998).     
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that would be incurred if the services were provided by a private ﬁrm.14 The
MCA also imposed uniform reserve requirements on all depository institutions
and granted nonmembers access to Reserve Bank payment services. Prior to
the MCA, free check clearing was one of the beneﬁts of membership. Access
to Fed services was now divorced from membership and was explicitly priced.
By forcing the Reserve Banks to charge prices that cover actual and im-
puted costs, the MCA went a long way toward leveling the competitive playing
ﬁeld. The Fed retained presentment privileges nonetheless. Private collecting
banks had no practical means of obtaining same-day funds.15 In response to
public concerns about the remaining asymmetry, the Board sought public com-
ment in 1988 on a proposal to extend Reserve Bank presentment rights to
private-sector banks, allowing them to present until 2:00 p.m. for settlement
the same day. Corporations objected to the proposal, however, because it would
hamper their ability to manage their accounts within the day.16 The compromise
that was ﬁnally adopted, effective January 1994, established the current regime
in which all banks have the right to same-day settlement for checks presented
by 8:00 a.m. The Reserve Banks retained the privilege of presenting until 2:00
p.m. for same-day funds.17
The six-hour monopoly could give the Reserve Banks an advantage over
competitors in some market segments. It means that the Reserve Banks can
collect a given set of checks on better terms than a private provider: for ex-
ample, by offering a later deposit deadline or better availability (less check
ﬂoat). A private-sector competitor would have to incur additional costs to
clear the same checks with the same availability. In some markets, particularly
for small and remote depository institutions where transportation time can be
14 The Federal Reserve’s cost recovery requirement includes a “private sector adjustment
factor” that consists of the taxes, fees, and return on capital applicable to a comparable private-
sector provider.
15 The rights of private collecting banks were governed by provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. For a description, see General Accounting Ofﬁce (1989), p. 28.
16 In arrangements called “controlled disbursements,” banks notify their corporate customers
early in the day of the value of the corporation’s checks presented that day, allowing the customers
to fund their accounts by selling money market securities. Later presentment makes such arrange-
ments more difﬁcult because money markets become progressively less liquid in the afternoon.
These costly efforts effectively skirt the prohibition on interest on corporate demand deposits and
are wasteful from society’s point of view. Note that corporate objections to extending private
presentment time to 2:00 p.m. are not directly relevant to the question of whether private and
Reserve Bank presentment times should be equalized; presumably they would also object if asked
whether the Reserve Banks should be able to present at 2:00 p.m. The objections might suggest
that, without interest on corporate checking accounts, equalization should take place at a time
earlier in the day rather than later. See Board of Governors (1991), p. 4747, for discussion of
public comments on the 1988 proposal.
17 The Board of Governors has recently requested public comment on the effect of the Janu-
ary 1994 same-day settlement rule. In addition, the Board is considering reducing or eliminating
legal disparities between Reserve Banks and private-sector collecting banks in the check collection
process, including the six-hour monopoly (Board of Governors 1998).   
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signiﬁcant, this advantage has given the Reserve Banks a dominant market
share. Indeed, in some locations only the Fed presents checks. In more geo-
graphically concentrated markets—large cities, for example—the six-hour mo-
nopoly provides little or no competitive advantage and the market share of the
Reserve Banks is correspondingly low.
The Allocation of Common Costs
How do the Fed’s check collection activities affect the allocation of the com-
mon costs? Since implementation of the MCA in the early 1980s, the Reserve
Banks price structure has determined the allocation of common costs. Early on,
Reserve Bank pricing under the MCA was relatively uniform, although prices
varied according to the destination of the check. At ﬁrst, prices at various Fed
ofﬁces depended only on whether the item was bound for a city or a remote
location. More recently, the price structure has become increasingly complex
with ﬁner geographical differentiation.
The increasing complexity of the Reserve Banks’ pricing has been a re-
sponse to competitive pressures. Initially, alternatives to Fed check clearing
were not well established. As private-sector clearing has grown over time, in-
creased price differentiation has lowered margins in market segments in which
alternative providers can compete effectively with the Fed. Maintaining full
cost recovery then requires higher margins in market segments where cus-
tomers have relatively few viable alternatives. Such markets are generally those
in which the Fed’s six-hour monopoly supports a dominant market share—
presentment to remote banks. Accordingly, common costs have shifted away
from market segments in which the six-hour monopoly yields no signiﬁcant
competitive advantage for the Fed—presentment to city endpoints.
The six-hour monopoly could allow the Fed to set prices below incremental
costs so that subsidization results. We previously noted that in industries which
have substantial common costs (like communications), competitive pressures
constrain the way those costs can be allocated across market segments; market
discipline generally prevents subsidization. Governmental barriers to compe-
tition can loosen the constraints of competitive pressure, however, because
they allow over-recovery of costs in protected market segments in order to
fund prices below incremental costs in other market segments. The six-hour
monopoly is exactly this type of barrier to competition. By raising the costs
of competitors, this advantage could allow the Reserve Banks to charge more
than stand-alone cost in the protected market segment (checks drawn on remote
banks) in order to price below incremental cost in contested market segments
(checks drawn on city banks). While these prices could further the goal of
universal access, they would be detrimental to economic efﬁciency, since some
users would face prices below incremental social cost.
Reserve Bank price setting is constrained by a speciﬁc methodology
designed to prevent cross-subsidies. Per-item fees must be above “ﬂoor cost,”       
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which is deﬁned essentially as average (attributable) variable cost. The in-
dividual check is not the only relevant increment, however. There are often
signiﬁcant costs that are attributable to a group of checks but not speciﬁcally
attributable to individual checks. For example, local transportation costs are
attributable to the collection of checks drawn on a particular group of banks,
though not to an individual customer or item. The total ﬂoor cost for a group
of checks is an underestimate of incremental cost if it excludes costs that are
attributable to that group of checks but not to any individual item.18 It is also
possible that ﬂoor costs overstate incremental costs, since network effects, if
they exist, reduce the true incremental cost of serving a market segment.
We need to entertain two alternative hypotheses, therefore, about the Fed’s
allocation of common costs. One hypothesis is that the Reserve Banks gener-
ally do not set fees below incremental costs or above the stand-alone costs.
The other is that in some market segments the Reserve Banks set some fees
below incremental costs and thus set fees above stand-alone costs elsewhere.19
These two hypotheses have different implications, as we will see, for how we
approach questions about the Fed’s role in payment system innovation.
Access
As noted earlier, the Federal Reserve lists payment system accessibility as an
important policy goal.20 The usual articulation of this goal speaks of the Fed
providing payment services to all depository institutions, particularly “smaller
institutions in remote locations that other providers might choose not to
serve.”21 Since there is undoubtedly some price at which alternative providers
would choose to serve a given location, access to the payment system must be
interpreted in terms of the cost of payment system services to small and remote
banks. Enhancing access to the payment system must mean lowering the cost
to small and remote banks.
Does the Fed lower the costs of check clearing for small and remote banks?
We have argued that the Fed’s presence tends to shift common costs toward
checks drawn on remote banks. Hence, cost allocation among banks is deter-
mined by whether checks drawn on remote banks make up a smaller portion
of the checks collected by remote banks than they do of checks collected by
18 Critics who have charged the Fed with unfairly subsidizing check collection have focused
on whether the Fed’s cost accounting methodology understates the overall cost of Fed check
collection. This question is separate from the question we discuss: cross-subsidization within Fed
check processing. The Board of Governors requires that the Reserve Banks annually recover the
full cost of check collection services from check collection fees.
19 Our reasonable hypothesis is that the Reserve Banks recover the full costs of check
collection in the aggregate.
20 The Monetary Control Act states that prices for Federal Reserve services “shall give due
regard to competitive factors and the provision of an adequate level of such services nationwide.”
21 Board of Governors (1990), p. 295.      
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city banks. If so, the Fed’s presence tends to favor small and remote banks.
Although to our knowledge no formal data is available, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the difference, if there is one, is not large. The shift of common
costs toward checks drawn on remote banks does not appear to alter appreciably
the relative burden imposed on small and remote banks. There are, however,
other dimensions of pricing along which the Federal Reserve may still be able
to pursue a goal of moderating costs for small and remote banks, although
direct quantitative evidence is unavailable.22
While we lack direct evidence on the extent to which the Fed shifts common
costs away from small and remote banks, some indirect evidence is available.
Last year Federal Reserve Board Vice Chair Alice Rivlin headed a committee
that examined the role of the Federal Reserve in the payment system.23 As part
of its work, the committee held a series of public forums. Many participants at
these forums expressed the widely shared belief that the Fed’s exit from check
clearing would raise the cost of check collection to small and remote banks.
Thus according to many people intimately involved in the check collection
industry, the Fed’s cost allocation does have the effect of enhancing universal
access. A reasonable working hypothesis is that the Fed’s presence does shift
at least some common costs away from small and remote banks.24
5. THE FED AS A PAYMENT SYSTEM INNOVATOR:
ELECTRONIC CHECK PRESENTMENT
We have argued that the Federal Reserve’s involvement in the check collection
industry closely parallels government involvement in the telecommunications
and postal services industries. Under this view, the Fed promotes universal
access by shifting common costs in the presence of legal barriers to compe-
tition. Rapid technological change is currently creating new opportunities for
innovation in payment services. As a major provider of payment services, the
Federal Reserve must determine its appropriate role in pursuing and promoting
innovations.
Our reading of the history of communications industries strongly suggests
that barriers to competition are fundamentally incompatible with the efﬁcient
22 For instance, Reserve Banks’ prices depend on the amount of sorting done by depositing
banks prior to depositing checks with the Fed. Small, remote banks are more likely to make
unsorted deposits than are large, city banks. The Fed could pursue its interest in access by setting
lower price-cost margins for unsorted than for sorted deposits, thereby lowering the cost of check
collection for small, remote banks.
23 Federal Reserve System (1998).
24 The shift of common costs away from small and remote banks might be independent
of the six-hour monopoly. Some participants in the Rivlin Committee Forums believe that the
Federal Reserve accepts a lower rate of return than would be required by commercial providers
or that the Fed does not account for the full costs of providing service.  
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adoption of new technologies. Barriers weaken the effectiveness of an organi-
zation’s innovative efforts, and they create opportunities for subsidies that can
distort the choices users make with respect to new technologies. For both rea-
sons, truly good innovations may fail to reach the market, while unworthy ones
may actually take hold. Without barriers to competition, cross-subsidization
would not be sustainable, and so we can have conﬁdence that the innovative
process is genuinely beneﬁcial.
How does one resolve the conﬂict between cross-subsidization and in-
novation? One approach is to measure incremental costs rigorously in order
to prevent subsidization. This approach, in essence, is the Federal Reserve’s
current practice. Earlier, however, we pointed out that the need to gauge incre-
mental costs and network effects across a wide assortment of user subgroups is
likely to make comprehensive measures of incremental costs difﬁcult to obtain.
Accounting data alone are not likely to convince a skeptic of the absence of
cross-subsidies.
An alternative approach to the conﬂict between cross-subsidization and
innovation as it pertains to Reserve Banks is to remove the conditions that
might lead to cross-subsidization. In the absence of special legal privileges,
competitive pressures will preclude cross-subsidization, as we deﬁned it earlier.
Removing the remaining barriers to competition would clearly demonstrate the
Fed’s commitment to efﬁcient innovation.
These principles apply to the Fed’s current efforts to implement ECP. As
with any innovation, the near-term prospects of ECP are uncertain. A recent
study by Joanna Stavins (1997), an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, attempts to quantify the overall costs and beneﬁts to society of a
transition to ECP. One advantage would come from replacing the resource cost
of transporting and processing paper checks with the lower cost of sending
electronic messages. On the other hand, some people prefer to get their checks
back. Further, under a variety of state laws, certain check writers are either
entitled or required to receive their canceled checks. While the estimates re-
ported by Stavins favor ECP, the results are sensitive to reasonable alternative
assumptions, particularly with regard to the intrinsic value of canceled checks
to consumers. As with other recently proposed payment innovations, such as
stored-value (“smart”) cards, it is probably too early to tell whether ECP will
make society better off or not.
Ideally, innovations would succeed in the marketplace if and only if they
were truly beneﬁcial to society. Accordingly, the Fed should introduce ECP in
such a way that we can be assured it will succeed if and only if it improves
payment system efﬁciency. In the absence of impediments to competition, a
new product or service generally will be proﬁtable if its value to customers, as
measured by willingness to pay, exceeds the cost at which providers are willing     
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to supply it.25 The usual presumption is that innovation in competitive settings
yields outcomes that are beneﬁcial to society as a whole. A necessary condition
is that prices are not inefﬁcient, that is, they do not embody cross-subsidies.
Barriers to competition allow inefﬁcient pricing. One way to ensure that the
Fed’s implementation of payment system innovations contributes to payment
system efﬁciency, therefore, is to remove artiﬁcial barriers to competition like
the six-hour monopoly.
Removing barriers to competition would help avoid some of the poten-
tial pitfalls that face a public entity participating in a commercial enterprise.
The Reserve Banks’ special legal status as public institutions, as opposed to
private, proﬁt-seeking businesses, could inhibit their pursuit of improvements
in products and processes. The structure of Federal Reserve decisionmaking
could result in unnecessarily high costs of research and development. It is
often difﬁcult for large organizations, particularly public institutions, to re-
spond nimbly to new technological opportunities. The difﬁculties experienced
by the U.S. Postal Service in implementing automation illustrate the challenge
of innovating at large, public-sector institutions.
An even more worrisome possibility is that an organization that is not
fully subject to market discipline could make wasteful investments designed
to hold on to market share. Many observers expect electronic payment in-
struments, such as debit cards, credit cards, or smart cards, increasingly to
displace checks. In this context, ECP could be viewed as an attempt to stem
the expected decline in check use. By reducing the cost of paper checks, ECP
could slow the transition to fully electronic payment instruments that are even
more beneﬁcial. As long as barriers shield the Fed from competitive pressures,
there is the potential for the Fed’s pursuit of payment system innovations to
conﬂict with payment system efﬁciency.
Yet there are good reasons for the Fed to pursue ECP research and develop-
ment. The Fed, the largest processor of paper checks in the economy, maintains
a substantial capital stock dedicated to that activity. The Fed would need to
integrate ECP investments into its current check collection infrastructure. As
a result, the Fed is likely to have a comparative advantage in evaluating the
technical characteristics of ECP investments. In addition, the Reserve Banks
have strong incentives to pursue innovations that, if successful, would enhance
the value of their existing check infrastructure. To the extent that the Fed’s de-
cisionmaking mimics that of a private business, the interdependence of paper
and electronic check collection gives the Fed appropriate incentives regarding
ECP research and development.
25 We mean proﬁtability in the sense that the expected present discounted value of net cash
ﬂows from the introduction of an innovation are positive. The Board of Governors imposes a
tighter constraint on Reserve Banks; net cash ﬂows must be positive each year in each priced
service line (check collection, automated clearing house, and so on).      
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Implementing ECP
What does all this mean for the implementation of ECP? Because it is uncertain
whether ECP will actually contribute to economic efﬁciency, the Fed should do
everything possible to ensure that ECP ﬂourishes only if genuinely warranted.
If ECP truly is to enhance economic efﬁciency, it ought to be possible to offer
it in a competitive market at prices that cover costs and attract users voluntar-
ily. Any implicit cross-subsidy could distort outcomes by driving some prices
below costs, so that users ﬁnd ECP attractive even if social costs exceeded
beneﬁts. Similarly, a legal privilege that dampens competitive pressures could
artiﬁcially tilt users through nonprice incentives toward an ECP service offered
by the Fed.
Because the paying bank has the right to insist on presentment of the paper
check, a key issue for ECP is inducing the paying bank to accept electronic
presentment. Stavins’ (1997) estimates indicate that while paying banks realize
signiﬁcant cost savings from ECP, check writers incur increased costs and lose
the beneﬁts of receiving canceled checks. Although her estimates suggest a
small net gain to paying banks and their customers, there will undoubtedly
be some instances in which ECP would raise the net cost to paying banks and
their customers. If the total beneﬁts of ECP exceed the total cost for payors and
payees combined, then it ought to be possible for paying banks and their cus-
tomers to be compensated by other participants. Such compensation could take
the form of fees for checks presented electronically, or alternatively, charges to
paying banks that wish to receive paper checks.
Net revenues from ECP services should cover the full incremental cost
of ECP if it is to be implemented without subsidization. In the absence of
barriers to competition, the Fed could not systematically violate this bound.
Theoretically, the six-hour monopoly gives the Fed the capability to subsidize
ECP; paying banks could be induced to adopt ECP before it is efﬁcient to do
so. Eliminating barriers to competition like the six-hour monopoly would help
ensure that ECP will succeed if and only if it is truly beneﬁcial to society.
One frequent suggestion by ECP advocates is that the Federal Reserve
alter its check presentment regulations so that paying banks are required to
accept presentment in electronic form as well as paper. Paying banks could
no longer insist on presentment of the paper check. This change is consistent
with a competitive market approach as long as paying banks who prefer to re-
ceive paper presentment are able to compensate collecting banks. If the paying
bank’s willingness to pay to receive paper exceeds the cost to collecting banks
of presenting paper, then the paying bank ought to be able to stay with paper.
Otherwise, the paying bank will receive presentment electronically.26
26 ECP was implemented quite rapidly in Switzerland under just such a scheme. Paying
banks must pay a substantially higher fee to receive paper checks.    
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Simply mandating participation by paying banks would short-circuit the
competitive discipline imposed by the need to enlist voluntary cooperation.
Then an ECP plan that marginally lowers the costs of collecting banks as a
whole might succeed, even though it imposes greater additional costs on paying
banks and their customers. Such a scheme would not be in society’s interests,
and yet it might be adopted if acceptance by paying banks of electronic pre-
sentment were mandated with no opt-out provision.
What about Access?
We have interpreted access in terms of the costs of check collection to small
and remote banks. Fed participation in the check collection system is intended,
in part, to make the cost to these banks lower than it otherwise would be. This
interpretation is consistent with two alternative hypotheses. First, the Fed’s
priced services could be free of cross-subsidies, and therefore efﬁcient, even
though its allocation of common costs might favor small and remote banks.
Second, the Fed’s pricing could involve cross-subsidies. In order to maintain
prices below incremental costs, the Fed would need to rely on market privileges
such as the six-hour monopoly.
If the six-hour monopoly is essential to achieving the Fed’s access goals,
then its continued presence could distort the implementation of ECP or other
innovations in check clearing. If current pricing involves cross-subsidies, then
the revenue from customers paying more than their stand-alone costs could be
used to push ECP prices below incremental cost. If the Fed’s current pricing
does not involve cross-subsidization, then the six-hour monopoly is not essen-
tial to the status quo price structure. In this last case it should be possible for
the Fed to implement ECP efﬁciently without sacriﬁcing universal access.
Which of these two hypotheses is correct? As we noted above, available
data cannot discriminate between the two, and the Fed’s ﬂoor-cost methodology
may not guarantee the absence of subsidies. Moreover, it will always be difﬁcult
to objectively verify the absence of cross-subsidies. As long as cross-subsidies
are possible, there will be those who question the Fed’s actions, particularly
with regard to new product offerings. How can the public be conﬁdent that
the Fed’s innovative efforts in the payment system enhance efﬁciency? The
simplest and most transparent measure would be to eliminate artiﬁcial barriers
to competition like the six-hour monopoly.
6. CONCLUSION
We have drawn lessons for Federal Reserve payment system policy from the
history of other communications industries. Government intervention in these
industries has been driven largely by the desire to allocate common costs in
order to enhance access for some users. We have argued that Federal Reserve
Banks’ provision of check collection services ﬁts the same pattern.    
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Providing access conﬂicts with technological progress when access is sup-
ported by subsidized prices and barriers to competition. In the telecommuni-
cations industry rapid innovation was stimulated by deregulation that required
a retreat from universal access. The U.S. Postal Service provides a contrasting
example in which protected markets were maintained but at an apparent cost in
foregone efﬁciency-enhancing innovation. The lesson for the Federal Reserve
seems clear: a pursuit of access that makes use of cross-subsidization interferes
with the efﬁcient implementation of payment system innovations. Subsidies
erode market discipline and distort choices among competing technologies.
Let us emphasize that it is not at all clear that the Fed currently subsidizes
any segment of the check collection market. Federal Reserve policy explicitly
seeks to prevent subsidization and promote payment system efﬁciency. With its
efforts to promote ECP, the Fed seeks to establish itself as a leader in payment
system innovation. The Fed is well suited to understand, evaluate, and help
implement new technologies in this area. For the Fed to be an effective leader,
however, the public must be conﬁdent that its choices are in the public interest.
Eliminating any remaining competitive advantages would deny the Fed the
capacity to subsidize and thus would enhance the credibility of the Federal
Reserve’s commitment to payment system efﬁciency.
GLOSSARY OF COST-RELATED TERMS
Common costs: Costs that cannot be attributed to a particular individual
or group. Note that there can be costs that are attributable to a group
but common among the members of the group.
Attributable costs: Costs that arise directly from the provision of services
to a particular individual, group, or market segment.
Fixed costs: Costs that do not vary with the quantity of a service produced.
Fixed costs can be common among all users or attributable to a subset
of users.
Network effects: The beneﬁts that one group’s participation creates for other
users of a communication service.
Incremental costs: The additional cost of extending a given amount of a
service to a particular individual, group, or market segment, given that
others are already being served. Incremental costs are attributable costs
(ﬁxed and variable) less any network beneﬁts created for others by
extending service to the particular individual or group.
Stand-alone costs: The cost of providing a free-standing service to an indi-
vidual or group, in isolation from other users. Stand-alone costs include
the value of the network beneﬁts that the group loses by not sharing joint
services with other users.    
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Subsidization: When the payments received from a group are less than the
incremental cost of providing service to that group.
Cross-subsidization: When the deﬁcit created by subsidizing one group is
made up for by charging another group more than its stand-alone cost.
APPENDIX
Electronic Check Presentment
While many payment system innovations take the form of new payment
instruments, electronic check presentment (ECP) is simply a means of bringing
modern information technology to bear on the clearing and settlement of a
very old payment instrument. The standard method of clearing and settlement
begins when the person or ﬁrm receiving a check deposits the check in his
or her bank. If the check is drawn on a different account at the same bank,
the check stays there and is paid with a bookkeeping transfer. Otherwise, the
check is physically transported to the bank on which it is drawn (the paying
bank). After physical presentment of the check takes place, funds are sent from
the paying bank to the collecting bank. Often this process is intermediated by
other banks (correspondents), Federal Reserve Banks, or by private contractors
(courier services, for example). A check that is not honored for some reason—
because of insufﬁcient funds in the check writers’ account, for example—is
returned to the bank at which it was initially deposited.
With electronic check presentment, consumers and businesses still conduct
transactions using paper checks. At some point in the process of clearing the
check, the relevant payment information is transferred into electronic form and
then sent on to the paying bank. The check itself may or may not continue
on its path to the paying bank. If the check is not sent to the paying bank,
it is called check truncation. Although truncation is not a necessary part of
ECP, many proponents believe that ECP can make its greatest contribution
to payment system efﬁciency in combination with truncation. Indeed, to the
extent that there are savings associated with substituting the ﬂow of electronic
information for a paper ﬂow, it would seem to make sense to have paper items
truncated as early as possible in the clearing process. On the other hand, the
occasional need to inspect the physical check suggests that it might be eco-
nomical for truncation to occur at a more central point in the process in order
to concentrate the storage of paper items.
All Reserve Bank ofﬁces currently offer paying banks the option of receiv-
ing electronic check presentment. Slightly less than 14 percent of the checks
processed by the Fed in 1997 were presented electronically. For about another 9
percent, information was sent electronically to the paying bank, although actual    
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presentment was made with paper checks. Reserve Bank representatives are
actively involved in several collaborative efforts with industry representatives
aimed at ﬁnding ways of increasing the use of ECP.
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